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PEER-TO-PEERING BEYOND THE HORIZON: CAN A P2P




For the last several years, technology developers have been in a tug of
war with copyright owners over the distribution of copyrighted works over
the Internet through peer-to-peer (P2P) networks.) In P2P networks, an
individual computer user connects directly to another, and copies electronic
files, often containing copyrighted works, from the other user's computer
onto his own. 2 Files are not stored on, and do not pass through, a central
server, 3 so the P2P network does not directly violate any of a copyright
owner's exclusive rights. 4 Therefore, to assert their rights against P2P net-
works, rather than against individual network users, copyright owners must
rely on secondary infringement, which holds one person liable for the in-
fringement of another.5 For convenience, distributors of software that al-
lows users to access P2P networks, network developers, network owners,
and network administrators are hereafter referred to simply as "administra-
tors."
Administrators have consistently attempted to design a network
around the legal tests for secondary liability, and courts have consistently
held that those administrators are liable under those tests.6 The first of this
line of cases was A&M Records v. Napster, Inc.7 There, the Court of Ap-
* J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2009. Mr. Minder practices intellectual property law at
Bryan Cave, LLP. The author gives many thanks to Professor Graeme B. Dinwoodie for his invaluable
insight and guidance, and to Dana Lobelle for her thoughtful and thought-provoking comments.
1. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
2. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1012.
3. Id.
4. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute, and perform or
display publicly).
5. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014, 1019.
6. See, e.g., Grokster, 545 U.S. at 919, 922; In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650
(7th Cir. 2003).
7. Napster,239F.3dat 1011.
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peals for the Ninth Circuit upheld a preliminary injunction against Napster,
holding that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail in showing that Napster
knowingly encouraged and assisted its users in infringing the plaintiffs'
copyrights. 8 Napster's system created search indices on its own servers,
which the program's search engine used to locate songs that a searching
user wanted to download.9 Napster's servers then directed the searching
user to another user's computer where the indices indicated that song was
saved, and the searching user connected to and downloaded the song direct-
ly from the other user's computer. 10
As a result of the preliminary injunction, Napster ceased to operate as
a P2P network, and ultimately reinvented itself as a noninfringing, licensed,
online music store.11 Shortly thereafter, new P2P networks appeared to
supply the demand for free music. 12 Those networks attempted to develop a
new technological structure that would allow them to avoid liability, essen-
tially using the Napster opinion as a blueprint.
13
Aimster was one such network. 14 The court had held Napster liable
because its unencrypted search indices provided knowledge of infringe-
ment and the ability to supervise the infringing activity. 15 Aimster therefore
used encryption software in an attempt to avoid that knowledge and ability
to supervise. 16 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected Aims-
ter's position, stating that "[w]illful blindness is knowledge." 17 Like Nap-
ster, Aimster affirmed a preliminary injunction that effectively shut down
the service. 18
Grokster and Morpheus were two other P2P networks that attempted
to fill Napster's shoes.19 The technology employed in these programs built
8. Id. at 1013, 1020, 1029.
9. Id. at 1012.
10. Id.
11. Eliza Shardlow Clark, Online Music Sharing in a Global Economy: The U.S. Effort to Com-
mand (or Survive) the Tidal Wave, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 141, 154-55 (2004-2005).
12. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 924-26 (2005)
(stating that StreamCast and Grokster both intended to capture Napster's market share after it stopped
operating as a P2P network).
13. E.g., Alec Klein, Going Napster One Better: Aimster Says Its File-Sharing Software Skirts
Legal Quagmire, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2001, at Al.
14. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2003). Aimster continued to use
indices on servers that were under the network developer's control. Id. at 646.
15. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021-22, 1024.
16. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 646.
17. Id. at 650.
18. Id. at 645, 656.
19. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913,924-25 (2005).
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networks without indices on servers under the administrators' control.20
Instead, the programs created the necessary indices directly on users' com-
puters.21 Thus, the defendants had attempted to avoid knowledge and con-
trol by relegating the search indices to users' computers. 22 This position
prevailed in the trial court,23 and was affirmed on appeal.24 The United
States Supreme Court, however, adopted a new type of secondary in-
fringement, resting liability on the defendants' promotion, or active in-
ducement, of infringement. 25 The Supreme Court reversed summary
judgment for Grokster and StreamCast (Morpheus's administrator), and
even suggested that summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs might be
in order.26
P2P administrators have continued to try to avoid liability by changing
the technological structure they employ.27 For example, BitTorrent tech-
nology breaks a file into smaller pieces, obtaining each piece independently
of the others, and from different sources. 28 The best shield for this model is
the heavy disaggregation and consequent practical difficulty of identifying
defendants, rather than any legal defense. 29
This comment also attempts to develop a model by which P2P net-
works can avoid copyright infringement. However, where prior administra-
tors seem to have addressed only one element of one legal test at a time,
this comment addresses all theories of liability, and attacks each element of
the test for each theory. In attempting to find a satisfactory solution, this
comment develops and analyzes two potential models that future P2P net-
works could employ to avoid liability for copyright infringement. Part I
describes those two models in detail. Part II then explains the law of sec-
ondary infringement, applies the two models to the relevant legal tests, and
20. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 922.
21. Id. at 921. Some versions of the programs created indices on supemodes, which were also
computers owned by individual users, and not under the control of the defendants. Id.
22. Jeffrey C. J. Lee, The Ongoing Design Duty in Universal Music Australia Pty. Ltd. v. Sharman
License Holdings Ltd.-Casting the Scope of Copyright Infringement Even Wider, 15 INT'L J.L. INFO.
TECH. 275, 289 (2007).
23. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1041 (C.D. Cal.
2003).
24. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1163, 1167 (9th Cir.
2004).
25. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936-37 (2005); see discussion infra Part II.B.3.
26. Id. at 941.
27. William Sloan Coats & Melissa Keyes, Recent Developments in Vicarious Liability & Copy-
right Licensing for Music, 915 PRACTISING LAW INST./PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, &
LITERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 257, 266-67 (2007).
28. Id. at 267.
29. Id. at 270.
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analyzes whether a P2P network operating on each model could avoid lia-
bility for copyright infringement.
I. POTENTIAL MODELS
This comment develops and analyzes two main fact patterns, which
reflect the two main perspectives of users who argue in favor of P2P net-
works. Namely, (1) that users should be allowed to share copyrighted
works with impunity, 30 and (2) that P2P networks serve legitimate, nonin-
fringing purposes that benefit society, and should continue to operate in
order to serve those purposes. 31 The first model, the "Commentary Model,"
is designed to fall within a safe harbor, which would allow an administrator
to avoid liability despite its users' sharing of copyrighted works.32 The
second model, the "Filter Model," would allow users to share only autho-
rized or public domain works, and thus would not infringe.
33
A. The Commentary Model
If P2P networks are to avoid infringement while still copying or dis-
tributing copyrighted works, they must bring themselves squarely under the
safe harbor adopted in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc.34 As discussed in more detail below, that safe harbor provides that, if a
product that can be used to infringe is also capable of substantial nonin-
fringing uses, the distributor of that product is not liable for contributory
infringement. 35 One way to fall within the Sony safe harbor is to build the
network's technological structure around the fair use doctrine. 36 While
30. E.g., Posting of Jonathan to Michael Geist, CRIA's Own Study Counters P2P Claims,
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/component/option,com-content/task,view/id,l 168/ltemid,85/ (Mar. 21,
2006, 02:17:15 EST). This view is based largely on general contempt for copyright law, and a belief
that the entertainment industry makes more money than it deserves. Id.
31. Brief for Sovereign Artists et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, at 18-19, Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480), 2005 WL 508103.
32. As discussed below, a Commentary Model P2P can avoid liability for the infringement of its
users; however, the users themselves will be liable for their own infringement. Direct liability of indi-
vidual users is beyond the scope of this comment, and is therefore discussed only insofar as it is rele-
vant to administrators' secondary liability.
33. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 492 n.43 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Noninfringing uses would include, for example, recording works that are
not protected by copyright, recording works that have entered the public domain, recording with per-
mission of the copyright owner, and, of course, any recording that qualifies as fair use.").
34. See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 442 (majority opinion).
35. Id.
36. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 945 (2005) (Gins-
burg, J., concurring).
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some courts have been generous with the fair use doctrine, 37 that generosity
has not extended to P2P networks. 38 Therefore, P2P networks must fit into
traditional notions of fair use at every turn in order to fall within the doc-
trine. Traditionally-protected fair uses include "criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching .... scholarship, [and] research." 39 In addition, the fair
use doctrine extends greater protection to uses that are "productive" and
"transformative."
40
The Commentary Model is based on criticism and comment, but in
some situations may also qualify as research and scholarship. This system
would center on sharing not the works themselves, but users' comments
about those works. A software program to implement the Commentary
Model would create a set of fields to be filled in by the user, such as artist
or author, title of the work, compilations in which the work is included,
synopsis of the story line (if applicable), the work's subject matter or inspi-
ration, and comments or criticism of the work. For simplicity, this set of
fields is hereafter collectively referred to as a "Commentary." After filling
in the relevant fields, the user would click a link to attach a file to the
Commentary, which would contain an excerpt, quotes, or the entire work.
The program would also create an index, like most post-Napster
P2Ps,41 directly on the user's computer. However, instead of indexing the
files the user is willing to share, it would index the Commentaries the user
has created or downloaded. Indeed, the user would be unable to share any
files directly, only Commentaries and any files attached to those Commen-
taries. Other users would therefore search for Commentaries about the par-
ticular work, rather than for the work itself. They would then download the
posting user's Commentary about that work, along with any attached file.
B. The Filter Model
This comment also discusses a model based not on avoiding liability
for unauthorized copying of a work, but on creating a network that shares
only authorized or public domain works. This model is similar to the sys-
tem recently implemented, even if unperfected, by YouTube,42 and to the
37. E.g., Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 448-56 (holding that "time shifting" is a fair use).
38. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting
"space shifting" as a fair use); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (same).
39. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
40. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A][l][b] (2007).
41. See, e.g., Grokster, 545 U.S. at 921.
42. YouTube Video Identification Beta, http://www.youtube.com/t/video id-about (2008) (an-
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system the District Court for the Central District of California has ordered
StreamCast to implement.43 Under this model, a copyright owner would
provide the administrator with a copy or a digital fingerprint44 of works the
owner does not want shared on the P2P network. The filtering program,
which would be included in the network software installed on the user's
computer, would prevent files that match that work or digital fingerprint
from being transferred through the network. How such a filter functions
technologically is beyond the scope of this comment. However, that similar
filters have been implemented, and that others are currently under devel-
opment, indicate that such a filter is technologically feasible.
45
One of the greatest benefits of this model is that it would allow copy-
right owners to decide whether and how to use their works to their greatest
advantage. For example, for those owners who benefit most from prevent-
ing the free sharing of works in order to sell more authorized copies, the
filter would prevent users from sharing those works. For others who prefer
to share their works for free, such as beginning musicians trying to expand
their audiences, they could continue to do so.
Perhaps the most exciting option, however, is that copyright owners
can use their works to generate revenue through the P2P network. YouTube
currently offers the ability for copyright owners to partner with it to gener-
ate revenue, although it does not further describe such an arrangement.46 In
the P2P network format, however, an administrator could employ several
methods to create revenue for the copyright owner.
One method would be to employ encryptions similar to those used by
the file-sharing system Weed, which "lock" an audio file after it is played a
certain number of times, and require the user to make a payment to "un-
nouncing the launching of the new filter, and briefly describing its features).
43. David 0. Blood, A Focus on Filters: Latest Developments in MGM v. Grokster, 646 LATHAM
& WATKINS CLIENT ALERT 1, 1 (2007) available at http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/
_pdf/pub204 1_ .pdf (describing the continuing litigation after the Supreme Court decision).
44. A digital fingerprint is a "unique combination of digital sound values or video picture ele-
ments[,]" which can be compared very quickly to an entire library of stored files, to identify files that
match the work from which the digital fingerprint was made. Patrick Tumer, Digital Video Copyright
Protection with File-Based Content, 16 MEDIA L. & POL'Y 165, 178-79 (2007).
45. Nate Anderson, Filter This: New YouTube Filter Greeted by Concerns over Fair Use, ARS
TECHNICA (2007), http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20071016-youtube-launches-beta-video-filter-
digital-rights-groups-shed-tear.html ("Plenty of third-party companies (such as MotionDSP, which we
profiled earlier this year) are also developing similar systems ...."); Steve Bryant, Two Big Reasons
Why a YouTube Filter Will Lead to More Problems, GOOGLE WATCH (2007),
http://gutgeewatshhyweuk.temwr-wil- ead_to_
more._problems.html (indicating that SNOCAP, Inc. and Audible Magic are working on similar filters).
46. YouTube Video Identification Beta, supra note 42.
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lock" the copy. 47 Thus, the filter would allow users to share files that match
a particular work's digital fingerprint only if the files include the encryp-
tion code, allowing a copyright owner to sell its works over a P2P network,
while preventing unauthorized, free copies from being distributed.
Another method would be a more traditional licensing arrangement.
Some P2P networks, such as KaZaA, have entered licensing agreements to
allow their users to share copyrighted works over their networks.48 The
proposed filter would allow any copy of licensed works to be freely shared,
while still preventing users from sharing unlicensed works. In addition, a
network could feasibly track the popularity of various works, so that the
copyright owner and the administrator could base licensing fees on the
amount of advertising revenue those works generate, like a traditional per-
centage of revenue royalty rate.
The Filter Model is not a perfect solution, however. One problem is
the burden it would place on copyright owners.49 This model would require
owners to take the affirmative steps of registering with a P2P network, and
providing either a copy of the work or the digital fingerprint the filter re-
quires. In addition, with the proliferation of similar filtering tools through
various networks, a copyright owner would have to take this action with
each network.50 As yet, no central database is under development. 51 To
help counter this detraction, an administrator implementing the Filter Mod-
el should adopt a policy of requesting, both before launching the network,
and periodically thereafter, authorization or digital fingerprints from each
of the major record companies and movie studios. Another problem is that
the Filter Model would not adequately protect fair use, because it would
block all sharing, including that which would be noninfringing despite
being unauthorized. 5
2
In sum, a filter system that prevents unauthorized works from being
shared on P2P networks, although imperfect, would allow P2P networks to
continue to accomplish their legitimate purposes, and could also create new
sources of revenue for copyright owners.
47. Michael A. Einhom & Bill Rosenblatt, Peer-to-Peer Networking and Digital Rights Manage-
ment: How Market Tools Can Solve Copyright Problems, 52 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 239, 259
(2005).
48. Eric Panner, Deal Ends Suits over P2P Files, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, July 28, 2006, at 1,
16.
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II. DISCUSSION
A. P2P Networks Can Serve Legitimate Purposes that Are Consistent
with the Goals of Copyright Law
While P2P networks can be used to infringe copyrights, they can also
be used for legitimate, lawful purposes that are entirely consistent with the
goals of copyright law. For example, dissemination of authorized works
does not constitute infringement. 53 Many musicians authorize the sharing
of their works through P2P networks. 54 Both new and established artists
recognize the benefits of sharing their works on P2P networks, such as
broadening audience bases and rejuvenating interest in back catalogs. 55
Likewise, various publishers authorize the sharing of electronic books and
other works. 56 In addition, many software developers distribute open
source software and program updates, such as Blizzard's World of War-
craft video game and Linux operating system updates, through P2P net-
works. 57 P2P networks are also used to disseminate public domain works. 58
Although these legitimate uses of P2P networks have not yet allowed
a P2P network to avoid liability, the fact that they serve the goals of copy-
right law indicates that they are worth protecting. The main goals of copy-
right are to motivate authors to create by compensating them for their work,
and to encourage dissemination of those works to the public. 59 After a work
passes into the public domain, however, copyright law is no longer con-
cerned with compensating the author, and dissemination becomes the only
goal. 60 P2P networks serve the goal of public dissemination by widely dis-
tributing works, and exponentially increasing the availability of those
works. 61 Moreover, for artists who benefit from increased audiences and
rejuvenation of interest in back catalogs, P2P networks can actually in-
53. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) ("the owner of a copyright under this title has the exclusive rights
to do and to authorize any of the following...") (emphasis added).
54. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 952 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
55. Brief for Sovereign Artists et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 31, at
18-19.
56. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 952-53 (Breyer, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 954; Posting of Oren to Oren Sreebny's Weblog, http://staff.washington.edu/oren/
weblog2/archives/2007/l 0/legitimateuses.html (Oct. 9, 2007).
58. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 953 (Breyer, J., concurring).
59. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990).
60. Id.
61. Brief for Sovereign Artists et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 31, at
17-18.
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crease the compensation for creative activity. 62 Likewise, software devel-
opers who can distribute software updates through P2P networks save the
expense of additional hardware and bandwidth to support those downloads,
thus increasing profit margins, or passing the savings on to consumers to
increase sales. 6 3 Thus, P2P networks are not inherently unlawful, but in-
stead serve legitimate purposes that further the goals of copyright law, and
should continue to operate to serve those purposes.
B. How the Law Applies to P2P Networks
Once it is established that P2P networks are not inherently unlawful, it
becomes necessary to determine how they can operate free from liability
for infringement, so that they can accomplish their legitimate purposes. As
discussed in more detail below, P2P networks connect users directly to
each other to transfer files, so the files do not pass through a centralized
server.64 Thus, only the users directly violate any of the copyright owner's
exclusive rights, leaving the administrators free from liability for direct
infringement. 65 For this reason, P2P networks, including the Commentary
Model and Filter Model developed in this comment, do not directly in-
fringe, and a plaintiff would have to rely on secondary infringement.
66
According to the Supreme Court, secondary infringement is a form of
vicarious liability, the goal of which is to "identify[] the circumstances in
which it is just to hold one individual accountable for the [infringement] of
another. '6 7 Of course, for one individual to be liable for another's in-
fringement, someone must have infringed. Therefore, direct infringement
by a third party is a threshold element of secondary infringement.
68
A plaintiff would likely be able to prove direct infringement by a third
62. Id. at 14 (35% of musicians surveyed believe free downloading of their music has helped their
careers).
63. See Jason Brooks, BitTorrent Lowers Lindows Costs, EWEEK, Apr. 12, 2004,
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1565018,00.asp.
64. Seth A. Miller, Peer-to-Peer File Distribution: An Analysis of Design, Liability, Litigation,
and Potential Solutions, 25 REV. LITIG. 181, 191-92 (2006). This is true even if the search indices are
located on the network's central servers. See id.
65. While users' liability for direct infringement remains an issue, this note focuses on the liability
of network administrators, and does not address direct user infringement here. Nevertheless, direct user
infringement is relevant to administrator liability, and is addressed in that context in the next section.
66. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 646-47 (7th Cir. 2003) ("But because copies of
the songs reside on the computers of the users and not on Aimster's own server, Aimster is not a direct
infringer of the copyrights on those songs.").
67. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984).
68. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 725 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936-37 (2005).
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party in a suit against a network employing the Commentary Model, but
not the Filter Model. To establish direct infringement, a plaintiff must
prove: (1) that the plaintiff owns a valid copyright in the material; and
(2) that a party has violated "at least one exclusive right granted to copy-
right holders."' 69 First, suits against P2P networks are generally brought by
the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), record companies,
movie studios, or publishers, all of which are in the business of owning
copyrights. 70 Therefore, this comment assumes that a plaintiff in such a
case would be able to prove ownership of a valid copyright.
A plaintiff could also prove that users of a Commentary Model P2P
violated an exclusive right. Users who provided works to others would
violate the exclusive rights to distribute the work and perhaps to perform
the work publicly.71 In addition, users who downloaded a work would
create a copy on their hard drive, violating the exclusive right to reproduce
the work.72 However, as discussed in greater detail below, that model is
designed around the fair use doctrine. Depending on the depth of each indi-
vidual Commentary, and the portion of the original work that is attached to
that Commentary, every single use in the Commentary Model could poten-
tially be a fair use.
Realistically, however, regardless of any guidelines the administrator
may provide to aid users in deciding how much of a work they could safely
include, some users would disregard those guidelines. 73 Moreover, within a
doctrine that requires a balancing of factors in light of the objectives of
copyright law, 74 on which Supreme Court Justices can disagree, 75 it would
defy reason to think that, even with adequate guidelines, every user would
69. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001).
70. See, e.g., Grokster, 545 U.S. at 913; Aimster, 334 F.3d at 645; Napster, 239 F.3d at 1004;
Interscope Records v. Leadbetter, No. C05-1149-MJP-RSL, 2007 WL 1217705 at *1 (W.D. Wash. Apr.
23, 2007).
71. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3), (4), (6) (2006); Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014; See Jill David, Does Grokster
Create a New Cause ofAction that Could Implicate the Apple TV?, 17 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 1197, 1203 (2006-2007).
72. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1); Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014. P2P technology generally does not involve
preparing derivative works (17 U.S.C. § 106(2)) or publicly displaying a work (17 U.S.C. § 106(5));
however, which rights are violated does not change the analysis for the defendant's liability for violat-
ing those rights.
73. See Malla Pollack, Rebalancing Section 512 to Protect Fair Users from Herds of Mice-
Trampling Elephants, or a Little Due Process Is Not Such a Dangerous Thing, 22 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 547, 553 (2005-2006).
74. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811,818 (9th Cir. 2003).
75. Compare Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 (1984) ("home
time-shifting is a fair use") with id. at 486 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("time-shifting cannot be deemed
a fair use").
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strike a balance with which every court would agree. Thus, at least some
Commentaries would inevitably fall outside of the fair use doctrine. Users
who shared or downloaded those Commentaries would violate the exclu-
sive right of the copyright holder to reproduce, to distribute, and to publicly
perform a work. 76 Therefore, users of a Commentary Model P2P who
shared Commentaries that fall outside the fair use doctrine would be direct
infringers. A plaintiff would thus be able to show the threshold requirement
of direct infringement by a third party.
The Filter Model, on the other hand, would prevent any unauthorized
works from being shared on the network. As the Supreme Court stated in
Sony, "anyone who is authorized by the copyright owner to use the copy-
righted work.., is not an infringer of the copyright .... -"77 Therefore,
under that model, no direct infringement would occur. A plaintiff's case
against a P2P employing the Filter Model would therefore fail at this thre-
shold issue.
This is true only to the extent that copyright owners provided the digi-
tal fingerprint necessary to prevent the sharing of unauthorized works. That
fact emphasizes the need for a policy of periodically requesting either au-
thorization or digital fingerprints from the major entertainment companies.
Even where some unauthorized works would not be filtered, the expense of
litigation 78 compared to the expense of providing a copy of the work or a
digital fingerprint would likely cause any copyright owner to choose the
latter course. For this reason, combined with the benefits outlined supra
Part I.B., it seems reasonable to assume that copyright owners would gen-
erally comply with such requests rather than sue. If the sharing of all unau-
thorized works could thus be prevented, a P2P employing the Filter Model
would not be liable for secondary infringement. Accordingly, this comment
will apply the other elements of secondary infringement only to the Com-
mentary Model.
Courts have developed three types secondary infringement: 79
76. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3), (4), (6).
77. Sony, 464 U.S. at 433.
78. In the year 2007, the average cost for copyright litigation through a full trial ranged from
$290,000 to $1 million. Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property,
93 VA. L. REV. 1899, 1909 n.23 (2007).
79. 3 NIMMER, supra note 40, at § 12.04[A][2]-[4]. While this comment applies the "better," and
more widely accepted, approach to secondary liability, the "inducement" theory could also be seen as a
further elaboration of contributory infringement, resulting in only two types of secondary infringement,
one of which has two subcategories. Id. § 12.04[A][4][b]; Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487
F.3d 701, 726 (9th Cir. 2007).
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(1) contributory infringement; 80 (2) active inducement; 81 and (3) vicarious
infringement. 82 Each type is directed at a different mode of culpable beha-
vior that would justify holding a P2P administrator liable for user infringe-
ment.83
1. Contributory Infringement
One type of secondary liability that a P2P network must avoid is con-
tributory infringement. 84 The landmark Sony case adopted contributory
infringement from patent law, holding that a defendant could be held liable
for knowingly distributing a product that is used to infringe copyrights. 8
5
However, Sony also adopted, as a safe harbor, patent law's "staple article of
commerce doctrine." 86 The Sony safe harbor provides that the sale of such
a product "does not constitute contributory infringement if the product
is... capable of substantial [or commercially significant] noninfringing
uses."' 87 The Supreme Court held that the Betamax video tape recorder in
that case satisfied that test.88
Defendant P2P networks have often invoked Sony's safe harbor, but
so far, to no avail.89 In Napster, the Ninth Circuit held that Napster "kno-
wingly encourages and assists the infringement of plaintiffs' copyrights." 90
The court interpreted Sony as simply declining to impute knowledge of
direct infringement from the product's design alone. 91 Because the plain-
tiffs had provided Napster with actual notice of infringing files, however,
Napster had the requisite knowledge, and was thus precluded from Sony's
safe harbor.92 The court did not decide whether Napster was capable of
substantial noninfringing uses, because it had proof of the requisite know-
ledge, and did not need to impute that knowledge from the design of the
80. E.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
81. E.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936 (2005).
82. E.g., id. at 930.
83. Id. at 942 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
84. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
85. Id. at 439, 442. However, the concept of "contributory infringement" had already begun to
develop in copyright law long before this. See, e.g., Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 63 (1911).
86. Sony, 464 U.S. at 440-42.
87. Id. at 442.
88. Id. at 456.
89. E.g., In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 651 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001).
90. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020.
91. Id. at 1020-21.
92. Id. at 1021.
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product. 93
In Aimster, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed
with Napster, creating a circuit split on the application of Sony.94 Aimster
held that actual knowledge of specific infringing uses is not sufficient to
hold the distributor of a product liable for contributory infringement. 95
Based in part on its belief that the Sony defendant would have fallen out-
side of Sony's safe harbor under Napster's test, the Seventh Circuit re-
quired more.96 The court found that Aimster's tutorial gave copyrighted
works as its only examples of file sharing, and that an add-on feature al-
lowed users easier access to invariably copyrighted top forty songs.97 This,
the court held, was the "invitation to infringement that the Supreme Court
found was missing in Sony."' 98 Aimster had also attempted to avoid the
requisite knowledge by incorporating an encryption feature that would
prevent the administrator from knowing what files were being shared on
the network.99 The court rejected that position, holding that "[w]illful
blindness" is sufficient to satisfy the knowledge requirement. ' 00
Aimster also held that, even if a product has noninfringing uses, if the
infringing uses are substantial, the defendant must also show that "it would
have been disproportionately costly for him to eliminate or at least reduce
substantially the infringing uses." 101 If the defendant could show this, it
would also fall within Sony, despite any knowledge of infringement. 102
While Aimster was theoretically capable of noninfringing uses, it failed to
present any evidence that it had ever been used for anything other than
infringement, or that such use was substantial. 103 Aimster also failed to
show that it would have been disproportionately costly to reduce infringe-
93. Id. While this reading of Sony calls into question whether its rule is indeed a "safe harbor," or
merely a rebuttable defense, the Supreme Court has subsequently characterized the rule as a safe harbor.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v, Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936 (2005) ("For the same reasons
that Sony took the staple-article doctrine of patent law as a model for its copyright safe-harbor rule, the
inducement rule, too, is a sensible one for copyright.").




98. Id. at 651.
99. Id. at 650.
100. Id. ("Willful blindness is knowledge, in copyright law (where indeed it may be enough that the
defendant should have known of the direct infringement) as it is in the law generally." (internal citations
omitted)).





ment. 104 Thus, the court held, Aimster did not fall under Sony's protec-
tion. 10 5
Subsequently, Grokster and StreamCast (Morpheus' administrator) at-
tempted to avoid the requisite knowledge by creating a more decentralized
architecture for their networks, by relegating search indices to users' com-
puters. 106 In that case, the district and appellate courts found the defen-
dants' position convincing, granting and affirming, respectively, partial
summary judgment for the defendants. 107 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged
Aimster's disagreement as to how to apply Sony, but noted that it was
bound by Napster.108 Nevertheless, the court's rule appears to lie some-
where between Napster and Aimster. The court concluded that, if a product
is capable of substantial noninfringing uses, the plaintiffs burden is
raised.' 09 The plaintiff must then show that the defendant had actual know-
ledge of specific infringing uses, and failed to act on that knowledge.10
The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff did not contest that the software
was capable of substantial noninfringing uses, and that the decentralized
architecture prevented actual knowledge of infringement."I ' The Ninth
Circuit then concluded that the defendants could not be liable under any
theory. "12
The Supreme Court vacated summary judgment, limiting Sony's hold-
ing to imputing knowledge under contributory infringement, but not dis-
placing other theories of vicarious liability. 113 The Court ultimately
adopted and resolved the case on a new theory of liability: active induce-
ment, which is discussed infra Part II.B.2.114 Thus, the Court declined to
address the Ninth Circuit's holding under contributory infringement. 115
In fact, Sony's boundaries are further obscured by the concurring opi-
nions, which, evenly split, arrive at different outcomes under Sony's safe
harbor.11 6 Moreover, those opinions address only the standard for finding
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 927-28 (2005).
107. Id.
108. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1163, 1162 n.9 (9th
Cir. 2004).
109. Id. at 1161.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1162-63.
112. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 934.
113. Id. at933-34.
114. Id. at 935.
115. Id. at 934.
116. Id. at 942 (Ginsburg, J., with whom Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy, J., join, concurring); id. at
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substantial noninfringing uses, and not the result thereof, upon which the
Ninth Circuit and Seventh Circuit are still split. 1 17 Thus, it appears that the
Ninth Circuit's holding that Grokster's and Morpheus's decentralized ar-
chitectures prevented the requisite knowledge, and that therefore the defen-
dants were not liable for contributory infringement, as opposed to any other
theory, still stands in the Ninth Circuit. 118 In addition, Aimster's holding
that substantial noninfringing uses would be a complete bar to contributory
infringement still stands in the Seventh Circuit. 119 Thus, substantial nonin-
fringing uses, combined with decentralized indices, would allow a Com-
mentary Model P2P to avoid contributory infringement in any
jurisdiction.120 Therefore, the standard for finding substantial noninfringing
uses is crucial.
In his concurring opinion in Grokster, Justice Stephen Breyer, joined
by two other Justices, applied a low standard for substantial noninfringing
uses.121 Justice Breyer found that Sony was satisfied because the plaintiffs'
survey showed that 10% of the uses of the defendants' networks were non-
infringing, a percentage comparable to that in Sony, and because that per-
centage was likely to increase. 122 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, however,
also joined by two other Justices, would require a stronger showing of sub-
stantial noninfringing uses. 123 Justice Ginsburg was particularly persuaded
by the fact that there was "no finding of any fair use and little beyond
anecdotal evidence[,]" some of which was hearsay, that authorized and
public domain works were shared on the defendants' networks. 124 Still,
Justice Ginsburg's opinion is unclear as to what is quantitatively "substan-
tial" under Sony.
125
What is clear, however, is that the more noninfringing uses a P2P
network can show, the more likely it will fall within Sony.126 Sony's hold-
949 (Breyer, J., with whom Stevens and O'Connor, Js., join, concurring).
117. See id. at 943 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 949 (Breyer, J., concurring).
118. See id. at 934 (majority opinion) (declining to address the Ninth Circuit's application of Sony,
other than to hold that other theories of secondary liability still apply).
119. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 652-53 (7th Cir. 2003).
120. Research fails to uncover any other jurisdictions applying the Sony safe harbor to products
capable of substantial noninfringing uses.
121. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 950-51 (2005)
(Breyer, J., concurring).
122. Id. at 952-54.
123. See id. at 945 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
124. Id.
125. See id. at 948 ("[Defendants'] products were, and had been for some time, overwhelmingly
used to infringe . .
126. See id.
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ing was based on findings that time-shifting was a fair use, and that some
copyright owners authorized home copying of their works. 127 The absence
of a fair use finding and insufficiency of evidence on authorization are the
bases for Justice Ginsburg's ability to distinguish Sony.128 Therefore, in
order to convince a majority of the Court129 that a Commentary Model P2P
would fall within Sony's safe harbor, these facts are crucial. Thus, a P2P
network must show, by persuasive and direct evidence, (a) that some of a
product's uses qualify as fair uses; 130 and (b) that the product is used to
share authorized and public domain works.13'
a. Fair Use
The Commentary Model is designed around the fair use doctrine, and
therefore much of the copying, distribution, and public performance that
would take place on such a network would qualify as a noninfringing use
under Sony. 132 The Copyright Act of 1976 (the Act) codifies the common
law doctrine of fair use, which the Supreme Court has described as "per-
mit[ting] courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on
occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to
foster."'133 Section 107 of the Act provides that the fair use of a work, such
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research,
does not constitute infringement. 134 That list is not exhaustive, however,
and courts have added to it where appropriate to maintain the proper bal-
ance between innovation and protection. 135 Additionally, in order to deter-
mine whether a use is a fair use, section 107 provides four nonexclusive
factors:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
127. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984).
128. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 945 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
129. Three Justices felt strongly enough that Sony was not satisfied to write separately to say so. Id.
at 942 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Three others felt strongly enough that Sony was satisfied to write in
opposition to those three. Id. at 949 (Breyer, J., concurring). The other three apparently did not feel
strongly enough either way to address that issue. Id. at 918 (majority opinion). While the makeup of the
Court has changed since this opinion, satisfying the requirements that the most copyright-owner-
friendly Justices pressed should also convince the more technology-friendly Justices.
130. Id. at 945 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Sony, 464 U.S. at 447.
131. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 945 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Sony, 464 U.S. at 446.
132. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
133. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 550 n.3 (1985) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
134. 17U.S.C.§ 107.
135. E.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 454-55 (holding that "time-shifting" is a fair use).
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(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the co-
pyrighted work. 1
36
i. Purpose and Character of the Use
The first factor to determine whether a use is a fair use is the "purpose
and character of the use," including whether it is commercial or nonprof-
it. 137 The Supreme Court has held that "[t]he enquiry here may be guided
by the examples given in the preamble to § 107 .... ,"138 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit has held further that "there is a strong pre-
sumption that factor one favors the defendant if the allegedly infringing
work fits the description of uses described in § 107."139 For example,
NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Institute held that the use of quotations from a semi-
nar manual was a fair use in an online criticism of that seminar. 140 Similar-
ly, Wright v. Warner Books, Inc. held that incorporating portions of
unpublished letters into a biography fit within scholarship or research, and
therefore qualified as a fair use. 141
The Commentary Model fits several of the descriptions in section 107.
The Commentaries created and shared on the network are intended to
comment on or criticize a prior work. Furthermore, the Commentary Model
can be used for research or scholarship, if users include factual information
in the Commentary, such as compilations in which the work can be found,
dates or locations of prior or subsequent versions, dates of creation or pub-
lication, events of the author's life surrounding authorship of the work,
source of inspiration, and so on. Thus, the guidance from section 107's
preamble, which states that criticism, comment, research, and scholarship
are fair uses, strongly favors a finding of fair use for the Commentary
Model.1
42
In addition to the uses enumerated in section 107's preamble, the pur-
pose and character factor is comprised of two additional sub-factors: the
136. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1)-(4).
137. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
138. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994).
139. NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471,477 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted).
140. Id.
141. Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 736, 740 (2d Cit. 1991).
142. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578.
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extent to which the new use is "transformative," and whether the new use is
commercial or non-profit.
143
A use is transformative, according to the Supreme Court, if it "adds
something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the
first with new expression, meaning, or message .... ,,144 A transformative
use is not necessary to find a fair use, but because it promotes the purpose
of copyright, which is the creation of new works, such a use is likely to be
a fair use. 145 Uses that have been deemed transformative include parodying
a prior work, 146 placing photos of concert posters in a biography of the
artist promoted in the posters, 147 and quoting from a prior literary work in
order to criticize it.148 The Commentary Model is based on the creation of a
new work, 149 the Commentary, which comments on a prior work. The text
of the Commentary would add something new, the purpose of which would
be to describe, analyze, or criticize the original work. In most cases, the
purpose of the original work is to entertain through music, so the purpose
would be changed.
In Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley, Ltd., the Second Cir-
cuit held that placing poster images "in chronological order on a timeline is
transformatively different from the mere expressive use of images on con-
cert posters or tickets."'150 There, the defendant wrote a biography on the
Grateful Dead, and, without authorization, included poster images for illu-
stration. 151 While an individual Commentary would not constitute such a
chronology, a single search result could. For example, if one or several
users commented on several Grateful Dead posters, including the date of
each poster's use and the circumstances surrounding its use, another user
could search for Commentaries on Grateful Dead posters, and the search
results would be something very similar to the defendant's chronology in
Bill Graham Archives. Indeed, depending on the depth of treatment of each
Commentary, the search could render something similar to a biography of
143. Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley, Ltd., 448 F.3d 605,608, 611-12 (2d Cir. 2006).
144. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 612.
148. NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir. 2004).
149. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (providing copyright protection to "original works of author-
ship fixed in any tangible medium of expression"). The Act does not define "work of authorship," but
merely provides an illustrative list, which includes literary works. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(l). The text of the
Commentaries, as well as which field to fill out and how, are "original" to the author of the Commen-
tary, and the work is "fixed in [a] tangible medium of expression" by saving it in the software.
150. Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 609.
151. Id. at607.
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the Grateful Dead. The same is true for several Commentaries on a musi-
cian's songs that create a timeline for the composition, performance, and
recording of each of those songs, or that describe the events in the musi-
cian's life that inspired those songs. Thus, such a use in the Commentary
Model would be transformative.
Another sub-factor of the purpose or character of the use is whether it
is commercial or non-profit. 152 If a use is commercial, that fact weighs
against a finding of fair use. 153 The primary inquiry for commerciality is
whether the defendant stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted
material without paying the customary price.154 Of course, in the Commen-
tary Model, the individual users would receive no financial benefit from
writing and sharing Commentaries on various works. Nevertheless, accord-
ing to Napster, "repeated and exploitative copying of copyrighted works,
even if the copies are not offered for sale, may constitute a commercial
use," if copies are made to save the expense of purchasing authorized cop-
ies. 155 Even so, in the Commentary Model, the purpose of attaching the
original work, or a portion thereof, is to give context to the comments on
that work, and not to save the expense of purchasing multiple authorized
copies. Any subsequent copying of the original work would be merely in-
cidental to users downloading and understanding the Commentary. 156
In addition, in Grokster, the Supreme Court found it particularly rele-
vant that more users led to greater advertising income, and that more in-
fringing files led to more users. 157 While that fact was relevant only to the
Court's conclusion on intent, 158 if such facts were true of a P2P using the
Commentary Model, it could also lead to a finding of commercial use.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated that the commercial use of copy-
righted material is presumptively unfair. 159
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has since tempered that statement,
holding that commercial use is not conclusive, but merely a fact to be con-
152. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001).
156. One may argue that this would be more true if users had the option to download only the
Commentary, without the attached work. However, as will become clear infra Part II.B.3.a), the extent
to which separating the Commentary from the attached work would weaken the vicarious infringement
supervision argument outweighs the extent to which it would strengthen the Sony fair use argument.
157. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 926 (2005).
158. Id. at 940.
159. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 562.
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sidered along with the other factors. 160 Moreover, it has held that "the more
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other fac-
tors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.
' 161
Thus, even if the Commentary Model is found to be commercial because
the administrator would likely sell advertising, or because users save the
expense of purchasing authorized copies, the transformative nature of the
use would reduce the effect of that finding.
In sum, the Commentary Model incorporates several of the uses enu-
merated in the preamble to section 107, which would weigh in favor of fair
use. The transformative nature of the use would also weigh in favor of fair
use. The commerciality would weigh against a fair use, but the transforma-
tive nature would reduce the effect of that sub-factor. Thus, in total, the
first factor, purpose and character of the use, would favor a finding of fair
use.
ii. Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The second factor to determine whether a use is a fair use is the "na-
ture of the copyrighted work."' 162 Creative works, as opposed to informa-
tional or factual works, are the core of intended copyright protection,
making fair use of those works more difficult to establish. 163 P2P litigation
generally focuses on musical compositions or other entertainment industry
works. 164 While no court has clearly defined what constitutes a creative
work, the law is clear that musical compositions and other entertainment
industry works are creative works. 165 Therefore, this factor would weigh
against a finding of fair use.
iii. Substantiality of the Portion Used
The third factor to determine whether a use is fair is the "amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole."' 166 This factor looks at whether the quantitative and qualitative
portion that was copied from the original work is reasonable in relation to
160. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 585.
161. Id. at 579.
162. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2006).
163. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994).
164. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 920 (2005).
165. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586; A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1016 (9th Cir.
2001).
166. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3).
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the purpose of the copying. 167 Copying the original work in its entirety
does not necessarily weigh against fair use. 168 However, even copying a
small portion of a work can be substantial if it copies the "heart" of the
work. 169 Ultimately, the extent of copying that is permissible varies with
the purpose and character of the use. 170 If the defendant copied the mini-
mum amount necessary for the intended transformative use, this factor
would favor a finding of fair use.
1 71
In the Commentary Model, therefore, the amount of the original work
that a user could attach to the Commentary would depend on the amount of
that work that is necessary to put the comments about the work in con-
text. 172 In some instances, a user could attach the entire work to the Com-
mentary, while in others a user could attach only a few quotes or a short
clip. Determining whether the user copied too substantial a portion would
therefore require a case-by-case analysis of the depth of the Commentary
and the amount copied. In some Commentaries, the amount and substan-
tiality of the portion used would weigh against fair use, and in some, it
would weigh in favor of fair use.
iv. Effect of the Use on the Market
The fourth factor to determine whether a use is fair is "the effect of the
use on the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work."' 173 Courts
consider not only the extent of market harm that the defendant's actions
caused, but also the extent of harm that would result if the defendant's con-
duct became unrestricted and widespread. 174 While some language from
Sony has been interpreted to create a presumption of market harm where
the use is commercial, such harm will not be inferred when the use is trans-
167. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
168. Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley, Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 613 (2d Cir. 2006). Copying
the entirety of the work has been held to be a fair use in taping a television broadcast for home viewing
at a later time, Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449-50 (1984); in
copying posters into a biographical book, Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 613; in copying pictures to
create thumbnail links for Internet searching, Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 821-22 (9th Cir.
2003); and in copying photographs in a magazine for criticism or comment, Haberman v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 201, 212 (D. Mass. 1986). Research fails to uncover any case holding that
copying an entire musical work is a fair use.
169. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564-65 (1985).
170. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586-87.
171. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 820-21.
172. See Haberman, 626 F. Supp. at 212.
173. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2006).
174. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590.
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formative. 175 Moreover, while this factor also looks at the market for deriv-
ative works, according to the Supreme Court, only uses that copyright
owners "would in general develop or license others to develop" are rele-
vant. 176 Thus, "there is no protectible derivative market for criticism," and
any suppression of demand because of a Commentary's biting criticism
would not be relevant to this factor.
77
Whether unlimited copying through P2P networks actually has an ef-
fect on the market value of musical works has been an issue of great con-
tention. 178 In the first trial against a P2P user, Sony BMG's head of
litigation testified that the plaintiff record companies had not "stopped to
calculate the amount of [actual] damages [they have] suffered due to down-
loading .... ,"179 The estimates of sales lost to P2P networks range from
several billion dollars per year,180 to virtually zero, 181 depending on how
the decrease in record sales is explained. However, because the attachments
to Commentaries would not necessarily contain the entire work, these gen-
eral estimates, as precise as they appear to be, cannot adequately address
this factor for the Commentary Model.
A general guideline for market harm is whether the new use serves as
a substitute for the original work on the market.182 In addition, market harm
is a question of degree, and the importance of this factor will vary with
both the amount of harm and the relative strength of the other factors. 18
3
In the Commentary Model, the effect on market value, like the subs-
tantiality of use, would require a Commentary-by-Commentary analysis. If
175. id. at 590-91.
176. Id. at 592; 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2007) ("A 'derivative work' is a work based upon one or more
preexisting works, .. . [in any] form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.").
177. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591-92.
178. See Rafael Rob & Joel Waldfogel, Piracy on the High C's: Music Downloading, Sales Dis-
placement, and Social Welfare in a Sample of College Students, 49 J.L. & ECON 29, 34-36 (2006).
179. Eric Bageman, RJAA Anti-P2P Campaign a Real Money Pit, According to Testimony, ARS
TECHNICA, Oct. 2, 2007, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20071002-music-industry-exec-p2p-
litigation-is-a-money-pit.html.
180. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8, Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480), 2004 WL
2289200. While the petition does not explain how this estimate was reached, it appears to attribute the
entire 31% decrease in record sales to P2P networks. Id.
181. John Schwartz, A Heretical View of File Sharing; New Report Says Downloading Doesn't Cut
Into CD Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2004, at C1 (discussing a study by Professors Felix Oberholzer-Gee
and Koleman S. Strumpf, which examined the correlation between free P2P downloads and the de-
crease in album sales). The study compared spikes in downloading activity to record sales during the
same period, finding essentially no correlation. Id. at C4. The study also concludes that most users who
download music would not have purchased that music if they were unable to download it. Id.
182. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591.
183. Id. at 590 n.21.
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a commentator attached only a few quotes from a large literary work184 or a
small cropped image of a visual work,185 that copying would likely have no
effect on market value at all, even if such use becomes unrestricted and
widespread. 186 On the other hand, if a commentator attached an entire song,
and that song served as a substitute for purchasing it, then unlimited copy-
ing by users could have a substantial effect on the market value of that
song. While it is possible, indeed likely, that many commentators would
attach the entire work to their Commentaries, this factor would weigh in
favor of fair use in the cases where they do not. Thus, in some Commenta-
ries, the market effect would favor a finding of fair use; in others, it would
weigh against fair use.
Considering the factors together, the ultimate conclusion depends
largely on the specific Commentary, and one cannot reach a general con-
clusion. The purpose and character of the use would favor a fair use find-
ing. The nature of the copyrighted work would weigh against fair use. The
substantiality of the portion used and the effect of the use on the market
would both require particularized inquiries into the specific Commentaries.
Depending on the Commentary, the ultimate conclusion of whether the use
is fair could come out either way. For this reason, one must conclude that,
while many Commentaries would fall outside of fair use, many would also
fall within it. Because many of the Commentaries would fall within the fair
use doctrine, sharing those Commentaries would be a noninfringing use of
a P2P employing the Commentary Model. 187 Thus, a Commentary Model
P2P could support a finding of fair use, as found in Sony 188 and required by
Justice Ginsburg's concurrence in Grokster.189 Therefore, the Commentary
Model would likely fall within the Sony safe harbor.
b. Authorized and Public Domain Works
In addition to fair use, a Commentary Model P2P could establish sub-
stantial noninfringing uses through authorization to share works. As Sony
184. See Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1264 (2d Cir. 1986) ("Nor do we believe
[the plaintiff] can credibly argue that the use of the quotations has harmed potential markets for her
work.").
185. See Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley, Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 614 (2d Cir. 2006).
186. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590.
187. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454-56 (1984) (holding
that home time-shifting is a fair use of the Betamax video tape recorder, and that, therefore, it is capable
of substantial noninfringing uses).
188. Id. at 454-55.




held, one copyright owner has "no right to prevent other copyright holders
from authorizing" the copying, distribution, or performance of their own
works through a given product. 190
In his concurring opinion in Grokster, Justice Breyer, writing for two
other Justices, accepted the defendants' evidence that many of the files
traded on those networks were authorized or in the public domain. 191 Jus-
tice Ginsburg, however, also writing for two other Justices, referred to it as
"mostly anecdotal evidence, sometimes obtained second-hand .... ,,192 She
appears to require testimony directly from copyright owners that sharing is
authorized, and may even require the percentage of authorized works to be
comparable to the percentage of allegedly infringing works. 193 Ultimately,
the result of this disagreement is that more voluminous and more direct
evidence of authorization is necessary to sustain a claim of substantial non-
infringing uses.
Copyright owners can use P2P networks to broaden audiences and re-
juvenate back catalogs.194 Many musicians therefore authorize the sharing
of their works through P2P networks.1 95 Various publishers also authorize
the sharing of electronic books and other works. 196 Software developers
often distribute software and updates through P2P networks to save ex-
pense in support systems. 197 P2P networks can also be used to disseminate
public domain works, for which authorization is unnecessary.' 98 All of
these noninfringing works could be shared freely through a Commentary
Model P2P, even without a detailed Commentary. A sharing user could list
only minimal identification information in the Commentary, and attach the
entire work. Thus, the evidence of authorized and public domain works is
available, but diligence in collecting it would be necessary for a Commen-
tary Model P2P to prevail.
In sum, the Commentaries that fall within the fair use doctrine, com-
190. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
191. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 952-53 (Breyer, J., concurring) (joined by Justice Stevens and Justice
O'Connor).
192. Id. at 946 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy).
193. See id. at 947 n.3 (noting that the Sony plaintiff owned approximately 10% of copyrighted
television programs, and that the Sony defendant presented owners of approximately the same percen-
tage of copyrighted television programs to testify that they authorized such copying).
194. Brief for Sovereign Artists et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 31, at
18-19.
195. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 952 (Breyer, J., concurring).
196. Id. at 952.
197. Id. at 953; Posting of Oren to Oren Sreebny's Weblog, supra note 57.
198. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 953 (Breyer, J., concurring).
[Vol 84:3
PEER-TO-PEERING BEYOND THE HORIZON
bined with the works that copyright owners authorize to be shared, would
likely satisfy the requirement of substantial noninfringing uses. Therefore,
the Commentary Model would likely fall within the Sony safe harbor. The
Ninth Circuit held in Grokster that decentralized search indices prevented
the actual knowledge of infringement required for a plaintiff to overcome
Sony, and the Supreme Court did not overrule that portion of the hold-
ing.199 In addition, the Seventh Circuit implicitly held that substantial non-
infringing uses would destroy a contributory infringement claim entirely. 200
Therefore, because the Commentary Model would fall within Sony's safe
harbor, and because it would also use decentralized search indices, the
administrator of such a network would not be liable for contributory in-
fringement.
Nevertheless, reliance on the Commentary Model to avoid liability for
contributory infringement is not without risk. The fair use doctrine can be
unpredictable. 201 Of greater concern, the boundaries of the Sony safe harbor
have not been defined sufficiently to know whether any given percentage
of noninfringing uses qualifies as substantial. 202 This risk sits in stark con-
trast to the Filter Model, which, assuming copyright owner cooperation,
prevents direct infringement by third parties. In the absence of direct in-




Having avoided liability for contributory infringement, the Commen-
tary Model must also escape liability for active inducement. As stated in
Grokster, a defendant is liable for active inducement if it "distributes a
device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown
by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringe-
ment .... -204 "Thus, where evidence goes beyond a product's characteris-
tics or the knowledge that it may be put to infringing uses, and shows
statements or actions directed to promoting infringement, Sony's [safe har-
199. See id. at 934 (majority opinion).
200. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1162 n.9 (9th Cir.
2004).
201. Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483, 1496
(2007).
202. Compare Grokster, 545 U.S. at 942 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) with id. at 949 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
203. See id. at 936 (majority opinion).
204. Id. at 936-37.
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bor] will not preclude liability." 205 Active inducement thus looks to a de-
fendant's course of personal conduct, rather than simply to the product's
design.206
In Grokster, the Supreme Court held three findings sufficient to show
active inducement. 207 "First, each company showed itself to be aiming to
satisfy a known source of demand for copyright infringement, the market
comprising former Napster users. '208 Second, neither company attempted
to develop ways to limit infringement through use of its software. 209 Third,
the defendants made more money from advertising through increased use
of their software, and infringement was the greatest use of the software.
210
The Court noted, however, that the second and third factors would not be
dispositive alone, but simply bolstered the conclusion drawn from the
first.211 Evidence to support these features came from the defendants' ad-
vertisements that aimed at capturing former Napster users and promoted
the software's ability to access copyrighted popular music, and from inter-
nal correspondence that indicated the intent to cause direct infringement.
212
Avoiding liability for active inducement under Grokster is simple in
theory, but likely difficult in practice. A P2P network simply must avoid
advertisements that promote infringement, must ensure that discoverable
internal correspondence is free of evidence of intent to induce infringe-
ment, and should attempt to develop ways to limit infringement. In the
Commentary Model, all advertisements should focus on the sharing of
Commentaries about works, which may incidentally have copies of the
works attached. As to limiting infringement, detailed tutorials on the rela-
tionship between the depth of the Commentary and the amount of the work
that can be attached would likely satisfy that obligation. For instance, users
should be advised that song clips should be as short as possible while still
allowing a person reading the Commentary to understand it. Another way
to limit infringement is to adopt a policy of immediately suspending any
accounts sharing a Commentary that the administrator believes may cross
into infringement.
205. Id. at 935.
206. Id. at 937 ("The inducement rule, instead, premises liability on purposeful, culpable expres-
sion and conduct, and thus does nothing to compromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovation
having a lawful purpose.").
207. Id. at 939, 941.
208. Id. at 939.
209. Id.
210. Id. at939-40.
211. Id. at 939 n.12,940.
212. Id. at 937-38.
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This theoretically simple solution has been complicated by one post-
Grokster case, however. In Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., instead of
viewing Grokster as a new theory of liability, the Ninth Circuit engaged in
an extended discussion of common law principles of intent, in order to
reconcile prior Ninth Circuit contributory infringement case law with the
Supreme Court's active inducement theory in Grokster.213 Ultimately, the
Ninth Circuit formulated a rule, under Grokster's active inducement prin-
ciple, that a computer system operator would be liable "if it has actual
knowledge that specific infringing material is available using its system...
and can take simple measures to prevent further damage to copyrighted
works,.., yet continues to provide access to infringing works. ' 214 This
formulation is very similar to both the Ninth Circuit's 215 and the Seventh
Circuit's 216 rule for contributory infringement. However, by articulating
this rule under Grokster's active inducement theory, the court rendered the
Sony safe harbor inapplicable.
217
A policy of immediately suspending any accounts sharing a Commen-
tary that may be infringing would allow a Commentary Model P2P to es-
cape this formulation of active inducement, as well. If the network
administrator gains actual knowledge of specific Commentaries that are
infringing, it must take simple measures to prevent further infringement.
218
Suspending users who share that Commentary would be a simple measure
that would prevent further damage to the copyrighted work. If the adminis-
trator does so, it would not continue to provide access to infringing works.
Thus, strict adherence to a suspension policy would allow a Commentary
Model P2P to avoid liability for active inducement under Perfect 10, Inc.
Even so, the difficulty of ensuring that no evidence of intent to induce
infringement is ever manifested in any discoverable internal document
highlights the risk inherent in the Commentary Model. By contrast, an ad-
ministrator of the Filter Model, if properly implemented, could not be held
liable for active inducement because that model prevents direct infringe-
213. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 727-29 (9th Cir. 2007).
214. Id. at 729 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
215. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Traditionally,
one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the
infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a contributory infringer.").
216. See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650, 653 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding a network
liable if it has knowledge of direct infringement, and cannot show that it would have been disproportio-
nately costly to eliminate or reduce infringing uses).
217. Perfect 10, Inc., 487 F.3d at 727.
218. SeeAimster, 334 F.3d at 648, 653.
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ment of all works registered with the administrator. 219
3. Vicarious Infringement
The third and final type of secondary infringement the Commentary
Model must escape is vicarious infringement. Vicarious infringement is an
"outgrowth" of respondeat superior.220 A defendant is liable for vicarious
infringement if it (a) has the right and ability to supervise the infringing
activity, and (b) acquires a direct financial benefit from the infringement.
221
a. Supervision
The first element is satisfied if a defendant has "both a legal right to
stop or limit the directly infringing conduct, as well as the practical ability
to do so."' 2 2 2 In Napster, the legal right to limit infringing conduct was es-
tablished by Napster's contractual right to refuse service and terminate
accounts at its discretion. 223 The practical ability to do so was established
by evidence that Napster had in fact blocked users, coupled with its ability
to search the network for infringing files, just as users search for files they
want to download.224
By contrast, in Perfect 10, Inc., the search engine Google did not have
the right and ability to stop direct infringement by third party websites that
copied, displayed, and distributed the plaintiffs copyrighted images. 225
This is because Google could not "terminate those third-party websites or
block their ability to host and serve infringing full-size images on the Inter-
net." 2
26
Professor Nimmer argues that vicarious infringement can be easily
avoided by simply not retaining a right to block users. 227 However, simul-
taneously avoiding liability for both the Perfect 10, Inc. brand of active
inducement and vicarious infringement is not so easy, because the control
necessary to avoid liability under the former 22 8 satisfies one of the elements
219. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936 (2005).
220. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022.
221. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930; Perfect 10, Inc., 487 F.3d at 729-30.
222. Perfect 10, Inc., 487 F.3d at 730.
223. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023.
224. Id. at 1023-24.
225. Perfect 10, Inc., 487 F.3d at 730.
226. Id. at 731.
227. NIMMER, supra note 40, at § 12.04[A][5][b].
228. See Perfect 10, Inc., 487 F.3d at 729 (holding that a computer system operator must take
simple measures to stop continued access to infringing material to avoid liability under Grokster).
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of the latter. 229 Furthermore, Aimster held that an encryption feature that
prevented the defendant from policing the service, which would destroy a
claim for vicarious infringement, was "merely another piece of evidence
that it was a contributory infringer. '230 Therefore, simply declining to re-
serve a right to terminate access to the network, or building the network in
a way that prevents that ability, would not allow a network to escape lia-
bility under all theories.
Nevertheless, a Commentary Model P2P has one argument that, de-
spite its weaknesses, may disprove the element of control over the directly
infringing conduct. Like in Napster, a P2P using the Commentary Model
would have the right and ability to terminate users' access to the net-
work.231 However, unlike in Napster, the user of such a P2P incorporates
the original copyrighted work into a new work, the Commentary. 232 The
work that is shared on the network is the Commentary, not the original
copyrighted work upon which the Commentary is based. Because Com-
mentaries are initially offered onto the network by their authors, sharing a
Commentary is not infringement. 233 Instead, the infringing act is writing
the Commentary in such a way that it infringes the original work, rather
than in a way that qualifies as a fair use. 234 The Commentary Model's ad-
ministrator would retain no right or ability to control the amount or subs-
tantiality of the portion of the original work that the Commentary author
incorporated into his Commentary, because that conduct would be done
entirely locally on the user's computer.
The Commentary Model is thus at least somewhat analogous to Brid-
geport Music, Inc. v. WM Music Corp.235 There, a plaintiff alleged vica-
rious infringement against the publisher of an allegedly infringing song.236
The court held that, because the publishing contract granted to the publish-
er only the right to own and exploit the works, but not the right to control
229. Id. at 730 (holding that the right and ability to stop infringement is an element of vicarious
infringement).
230. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2003).
231. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 2001).
232. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). The text of the Commentaries, as well as which field to fill out
and how, are "original" to the author of the Commentary, and the work is "fixed in [a] tangible medium
of expression" by saving it in the software.
233. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 ("the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and
to authorize" the enumerated acts); 17 U.S.C. § 201 ("Copyright in a work protected under this title
vests initially in the author or authors of the work."). If an author submits his work to a P2P, he assured-
ly would at least implicitly authorize other users to further share that work.
234. See discussion supra Part ll.B.1.a).
235. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. WM Music Corp., 508 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 2007).
236. Id
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the song writing activities, the publisher did not have the right or ability to
control the infringing conduct of writing the infringing song.237 Likewise, a
Commentary Model P2P would retain the right and ability to control the
distribution of the infringing work, but not the infringing conduct of writ-
ing the infringing Commentary. Therefore, a Commentary Model P2P
would not be liable for vicarious infringement.
Nevertheless, this argument has its weaknesses. The entire argument is
based on viewing a Commentary and the attachment embodying the origi-
nal copyrighted work as one new and inseparable work. The administrator
has no control over the infringing creation of this work. However, if a court
viewed the Commentary as a separate work, independent from the attached
copyrighted work, then sharing the copyrighted work attached to the Com-
mentary would constitute infringement. 238 The administrator would have
the right and ability to limit access to the network, and thus to stop the
sharing of that attached copyrighted work. Thus, if a court were not per-
suaded by the analogy to a publisher, a plaintiff would be able to prove the
administrator had the right and ability to stop or limit the infringement. 
239
b. Financial Benefit
The second element of vicarious infringement is a financial benefit. A
financial benefit exists where the infringing material acts as a draw for
customers. 240 In Napster, the court held that the financial benefit element
was satisfied where the defendant's revenue depended on increases in its
user base, and its user base increased with the availability of infringing
music files. 24 1
The simplest and strongest way to attack this element of vicarious in-
fringement is to have no financial benefit; in other words, to make no mon-
ey. This is, of course, not the most profitable business model. Whether a
Commentary Model P2P makes money through advertising revenue or
through charging subscription fees, a greater user base would mean greater
profits, like in Napster. The more material that is available through a P2P
network, the greater would be the draw for a user base.24 2 This is likely true
237. Id.
238. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3), (4), (6); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014
(9th Cir. 2001); See David, supra note 71, at 1203.
239. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.con, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 730 (9th Cir. 2007).
240. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023.
241. Id.
242. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 940 (2005).
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for both infringing and noninfringing material. 243 Thus, regardless of the
draw of noninfringing material, more infringing material would also in-
crease the user base, and consequently the revenue. Therefore, essentially
any P2P model that makes money is indistinguishable from Napster on this
element.
However, both elements of vicarious infringement must be satisfied to
impose liability.244 Thus, if a Commentary Model P2P were able to con-
vince a court that the infringing act is the authorship of a Commentary, an
act over which it has no control, it could escape liability for vicarious in-
fringement. As noted above, however, this argument is somewhat tenuous.
This again highlights the advantage of avoiding direct infringement by
employing the Filter Model.
CONCLUSION
P2P networks serve legitimate purposes that are consistent with the
goals of copyright law. For that reason, the legal community should advise
the technology community of a way to design a P2P network that can avoid
liability for secondary infringement, and thus continue to operate in order
to serve those legitimate purposes.
One way to avoid liability is to design the P2P network around the fair
use doctrine. The Commentary Model does so, and therefore would likely
fall within the Sony safe harbor. If all advertising and office communica-
tions were diligently guarded so that they did not contain evidence of intent
to encourage infringement, a Commentary Model P2P could also avoid
liability for active inducement. In addition, the Commentary Model is de-
signed so that an administrator implementing it would have no control over
the infringing authorship of a Commentary. By analogizing to the publisher
of an infringing work,245 a Commentary Model P2P may also be able to
avoid liability for vicarious infringement. However, the Commentary Mod-
el would operate close to the line of infringement, and therefore would
have some risks.
Another, far less risky way to avoid liability is to develop a filter to
prevent sharing unauthorized works. A defendant is not liable for contribu-
tory infringement, active inducement, or vicarious infringement in the ab-
sence of direct infringement. 246 Thus, by preventing direct infringement, a
243. See id. at 954 (Breyer, J, concurring).
244. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022-23.
245. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. WM Music Corp., 508 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 2007).
246. See Grokster. 545 U.S. at 930.
2010]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
P2P employing the Filter Model would be able to avoid liability under any
theory. This model is not perfect, however, because it would impose signif-
icant burdens on copyright owners, and would not adequately protect fair
uses.
Previously, P2P administrators have designed networks around the
features of their predecessors that led to liability. This comment has con-
tinued this process, and developed two potential models for P2P networks
to avoid liability under current case law. 247 The ability of these two models
to avoid liability indicates that technological structure is one potential solu-
tion to the P2P problem. While no solution herein devised is perfect, if we
continue peering towards the horizon, we may find a way to peer-to-peer
beyond it. We may even find an island of author compensation along the
way, and make honest sailors of pirates.
247. Even so,
It must be recognized.., that the three strands of secondary liability discussed above are not
necessarily exclusive .... [A] party intent on avoiding responsibility, even if it assiduously
avoids respondeat superior vicarious liability, contributory infringement under Sony, and in-
ducement under Grokster, is not automatically out of the woods. Nothing forecloses yet
another doctrine from arising in future cases where appropriate analogy to common law can
fill the gaps left by existing species of secondary liability.
NIMMER, supra note 40, at § 12.04[A][5][a].
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